A survey of complexity results for non-monotonic logics  by Cadoli, Marco & Schaerf, Marco
J. LOGIC PROGRAMMING IW3:17:127-I60 127 
A SURVEY OF COMPLEXITY RESULTS FOR 
NON-MONOTONIC LOGICS” 
MARCO CADOLI AND MARCO SCHAERF+ 
D This paper surveys the main results appearing in the literature on the 
computational complexity of non-monotonic inference tasks. We not only 
give results about the tractability/intractability of the individual problems 
but we also analyze sources of complexity and explain intuitively the 
nature of easy/hard cases. We focus mainly on non-monotonic for- 
malisms, like default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, closed- 
world reasoning, and abduction, whose relations with logic programming 
are clear and well studied. Complexity as well as recursion-theoretic 
results are surveyed. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Non-monotonic logics and negation as failure in logic programming have been 
defined with the goal of providing formal tools for the representation of default 
information. One of the ideas underlying both areas is that the use of default 
assumptions should lead to a more compact representation of knowledge. As a 
consequence, non-monotonic knowledge bases should be more space-effective than 
ordinary ones and this may hopefully have an impact on the performances of 
theorem provers. 
This expectation generated an interesting activity in the development of algo- 
rithms for reasoning under non-monotonicity, as well as many studies about the 
inherent complexity of the inference tasks. 
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The goal of this paper is to survey the main results appearing in the literature 
on the computational complexity of non-monotonic inference tasks. We not only 
give results about the tractability/intractability of the individual problems, but we 
also analyze sources of complexity and explain intuitively the nature of easy/hard 
cases. Furthermore, we create an extensive list of references to the literature that, 
in our opinion, will provide a useful tool for researches interested in designing 
algorithms for non-monotonic reasoning (NMR in the sequel). 
We focus mainly on non-monotonic formalisms, like default logic, autoepistemic 
logic, circumscription, closed-world reasoning, and abduction, whose relations with 
logic programming are clear and well studied. Other reasoning problems, like 
reasoning on inheritance networks or belief revision, are only briefly mentioned. 
We refer the reader to works like [39] and [89] for extensive surveys on NMR 
and to [123] for a survey on the relations between NMR and logic programming. 
Works on NMR that survey complexity results have been done by Minker [103] and 
Schlipf [139]. 
Many results that have appeared in the literature are concerned with decidable 
fragments of non-monotonic logics. In the spirit of a well-established trend in 
knowledge representation [20], they aim at the characterization of the expressive 
power of languages having polynomial time reasoning procedures. Other works 
deal with fully expressive languages and try to characterize the precise complexity 
of the inference task. In this paper we are interested in both kinds of results, 
privileging the analysis of propositional, decidable languages. 
We use the jargon of computational complexity and recursion theory, as found 
in [54] and in [131], respectively. In particular, we make use of the notions of 
polynomial, arithmetical, and analytical hierarchies. 
Using notions of higher-order complexity is necessary, since a general property 
of non-monotonic inference is that its computational complexity is higher than the 
complexity of the underlying monotonic logic. As an example, restricting the 
expressiveness of the language to Horn clauses allows for polynomial inference as 
far as classical propositional ogic is concerned [401, but the inference task becomes 
NP-hard when propositional default logic [1501 or circumscription [261 are consid- 
ered. 
The fact that non-monotonicity adds complexity to reasoning was clear from the 
first studies: In his seminal paper, Reiter [129] showed that inference in default 
logic is not recursively enumerable (r.e. in the sequel). The issue of determining 
precise lower and upper bounds was addressed later, and some formalisms have 
been proved to be complete for precise levels of the arithmetical or analytical 
hierarchy [5, 25, 34, 1351. Analogous completeness results have been found for the 
propositional versions of the same formalisms wrt some levels of the polynomial 
hierarchy [41, 641. 
Part of the increase in the complexity of inference can be explained by noticing 
that the semantic definitions of most non-monotonic formalisms are either based 
on tixpoint constructions or on conditions requiring some form of minima&. This 
apparently gives a completely orthogonal source of complexity. 
Examples of formalisms based on fixpoint semantics are default [1291 and 
autoepistemic logic [104] where deduction is performed wrt extensions or expan- 
sions, which are solutions of fntpoint equations. As we see in the following sections, 
this frxpoint construction requires an additional nondeterministic choice that 
cannot be polynomially reduced to a deterministic one unless the polynomial 
hierarchy collapses. 
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An example of non-monotonic formalism based on a form of minimality is 
circumscription [85, 98, 991, in which inference is performed wrt the models of a 
first-order formula in which the extension of some selected predicates is mini- 
mized. As it turns out, the minimality requirement gives rise to a computational 
overhead that is analogous to that given by the fixpoint construction. 
The paper is organized as follows: After an introductory section on complexity 
concepts (Section 2), we first survey the formalisms based on fixpoint constructions, 
starting with default logic, which is presented in Section 3. The structure of 
reasoning in default logic makes it easy to point out precisely the various sources of 
complexity present in this kind of non-monotonic formalisms. We then discuss in 
Section 4 modal non-monotonic logics, with particular attention to autoepistemic 
logic. The introduction of negation in logic programming has produced a prolifera- 
tion of semantics, some based on fixpoint constructions (e.g., stable model seman- 
tics) and other on minimal models (e.g., well-founded semantics). Complexity 
results for the various semantics are surveyed in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss 
non-monotonic formalisms whose semantics is based on some form of minimality, 
which are the different forms of closed-world reasoning and circumscription. In 
Section 7 we carry on an analysis of the complexity of the so-called logic-based 
abduction and, very briefly, mention results for other forms of abduction. While 
abduction is not strictly a formalism for NMR, nevertheless it is tightly related both 
to it and to logic programming. In Section 8 we discuss in some detail the various 
reductions between NMR problems pointing out their importance from the point 
of view of computational complexity analysis. Finally, in Section 9 we draw some 
conclusions. 
2. COMPLEXITY CLASSES 
In this section we give a brief overview of complexity concepts that will be used 
throughout the paper. We refer the reader to [54] and [74l for a thorough 
introduction to the field of complexity. 
In this paper we deal most of the time with decision problems, that is, problems 
that admit a boolean answer. For decision problems the class P is the set of 
problems that can be answered by a Turing machine in polynomial time. Often we 
refer to computations done by nondeterministic Turing machines. The class of 
decision problems that can be solved by a nondeterministic Turing machine in 
polynomial time-where it is understood that the answer is yes provided at least 
ooze of the computations done in parallel by the machine ends in an accepting state 
-is denoted by NP. The class of problems whose answer is always the complement 
of those in NP is denoted by co-NP. Also problems in co-NP can be solved by a 
nondeterministic Turing Machine in polynomial time, but it is understood that the 
answer is yes provided all the computati6ns done in parallel by the machine end in 
an accepting state. The class P is obviously contained both in NP and in co-NP. 
An example of a problem in NP is testing satisfiability of a propositional 
formula: A formula T is satisfiable iff at least one truth assignment M such that 
M != T exists. An example of a problem in co-NP is testing if a propositional 
formula T entails a propositional formula y: T != y iff for all truth assignments M 
it holds that (M != T) = (A4 k y). In fact propositional satisfiability (entailment) is 
an NP-complete (co-NP-complete) problem, that is the “toughest”-wrt many-one 
polynomial reducibility-problem in the class NP (co-NP). We recall that the best 
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algorithms known for solving NP-complete or co-NP-complete problems require 
exponential time in the worst case, and that the following relations are conjec- 
tured: P c NP, P c co-NP, NP # co-NP. 
In the following we refer to a particular type of computation called computation 
with oracles. Oracles are intuitively subroutines without cost. Given a class of 
decision problems C, the class PC (NP’) is the class of decision problems that can 
be solved in polynomial time by a deterministic (nondeterministic) machine that 
uses an oracle for the problems in C, that is a subroutine for any problem in C that 
can be called several times, spending just one time-unit for each call. 
The definition of polynomial hierarchy is based on oracle computations. The 
classes Z,$, II{, and At of the polynomial hierarchy are defined by 
Cg=II,p=A{=P 
and, for all k 2 0, 
X[+ 1 = NP? I@+, = co-CR+ 1, Ag,, = P”t. 
Notice that Cp = NP, II,P = co-NP, Ap = P. The following relations have been 
conjectured: 
We say that a problem is at the kth level of the polynomial hierarchy if it is 
A$+,-complete under polynomial Turing reductions, that is, it is in A$+i and it is 
either CR-hard or II[-hard. Propositional satisfiability and entailment are both at 
the first level. 
In the following we focus on problems in CJ’ ( = NPNP) and II.$ ( = co-NPNP), as 
they are important in this paper. 2.2” contains all problems solvable in nondeter- 
ministic polynomial time provided it is possible to use for free a subroutine for a 
problem in NP-for example, propositional satisfiability. The prototypical XC,P-com- 
plete problem is testing validity of a quantified boolean formula Q (called QBF2,a 
formula) of this kind: 
3x1 ..a 3x,Vy, -1. Vy, E 
where x l,...,X,,Yl,..., y, are distinct propositional letters and E is a purely 
propositional formula built on such letters. The formula Q is valid iff there exists a 
truth value assignment o the propositional letters xi,. . ., x, such that for each 
possible extension of such an assignment o the letters y,, . . . , y,, Q is true. The 
prototypical II!-complete problem is testing validity of a quantified boolean 
formula of this kind (called a QBF,,, formula): 
vx, ... Vx,3y, ..a 3y, E 
We refer the reader to [llll for examples of A$-complete problems. 
In virtue of the conjectures Xl c X{+i and II[ c II{+i, X&‘-complete and 
II,P-complete problems are considered more difficult to solve than both NP-com- 
plete and co-NP-complete problems. A practical difference exists between NP- 
complete and ZJ’ complete problems. Suppose we have a good heuristic for solving 
an NP-complete problem (as an example, propositional satisfiability testing) that 
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normally solves the problem in an acceptable amount of time-even if exponential 
time is needed in the worst case. It is still not immediate how to use such a good 
heuristic for solving efficiently a Z,,P-complete problem. As a matter of fact, if the 
conjecture NP c C,P is true, then in the worst case an exponential number of calls 
to an algorithm for satisfiability testing would be necessary in order to solve any 
Q-complete problem. The same holds for IIt-complete problems. Methods such 
as GSAT [145] for efficient handling of NP-complete problems are therefore most 
likely not applicable to problems at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. 
On the other hand A$-complete (= PNP-complete) problems are “mildly” harder 
than NP-complete ones, since they can be solved by means of a polynomial number 
of calls to an algorithm for satisfiability testing. 
As we shall see in the sequel, many problems in propositional non-monotonic 
reasoning are C,P-complete or II&‘-complete, and many algorithms designed for 
solving such problems use satisfiability testers as subroutines. 
The last class of decision problems we introduce are those polynomially solvable 
by a deterministic Turing machine with no more than f(n) calls to a C,( oracle. 
Such a class is denoted by P zftf@)l, where f(n) is a polynomial function of the size 
n of the problem instance. In particular we will mention in the paper the class 
pWW~)l. We notice that NP c pNP[b(n)l c A$ and that the containments are 
conjectured to be strict. 
Throughout this paper we assume that all of the above mentioned conjectures 
are true. 
If two decision problems A and B are complete for the same class, then there is 
always a way to solve any instance of A by solving a single instance of B and vice 
versa. In Section 8 we will discuss in detail applications of this property to NMR 
problems. 
Sometimes we refer to search problems, that is, problems whose answer is more 
complex than just a boolean value. As an example, finding a satisfying truth 
assignment for a propositional formula is a search problem. An interesting class of 
search problems is FA$‘, which is the set of problems solvable in polynomial time by 
a machine with access to an oracle for an NP problem. If the oracle can be 
accessed only a logarithmic number of times, then we have the class FPNP1’og(n)l. 
While the polynomial hierarchy is an attempt at characterizing “how polynomi- 
ally uncomputable” is a decidable function, the arithmetical and analytical hierar- 
chies-which are precursors of the polynomial hierarchy-are characterizations of 
“how undecidable” is a function. For the sake of brevity we do not give precise 
definitions but refer the reader to [131], and [70]. We just recall that the elements 
At, Ci, II: of the arithmetical hierarchy and the classes A\, Xi, n: of the analyti- 
cal hierarchy are defined similarly to the elements of the polynomial hierarchy. 
While separation among the levels of the polynomial hierarchy is only conjectured, 
separation in both the arithmetical and the analytical hierarchies has been formally 
proved. Moreover, any element of the analytical hierarchy is harder than any 
element of the arithmetical hierarchy. 
3. DEFAULT LOGIC 
Default logic has been defined by Reiter in [129] and it is one of the more 
extensively studied non-monotonic formalisms. Interesting relations between de- 
fault logic and logic programming have been shown by Bidoit and Froidevaux in 
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1131. They used default logic for defining a semantics for negation in logic 
programming. 
In default logic the knowledge about the world is divided into two parts, 
representing certain knowledge and defeasible rules, respectively. The first part 
(denoted by IV> is a set of closed first-order formulae, while the second one 
(denoted by 0) is a collection of special inference rules called defaults. A default is 
a rule of the form 
where (Y(X), /3,(x>, . . . , /3,(x), y(x) are wffs whose free variables are among those of 
x=xi,...,x,. (Y(X) is called the prerequisite of the default, PI(x), . . . , p,(x) (n 2 0) 
are called justifications, and -y(x) is the consequence. When n = 0, then the 
propositional constant true is implicitly assumed as the justification of the default. 
A default is closed if none of (Y p,, . . . , p,,, y contains free variables. A default 
theory (D, W) is closed iff all the defaults in D are closed. 
There are two special cases of default rules which are frequently used. Default 
rules of the form a(x): P(x)//~(x) and a(x): /3(x> A r(x)/P(x> are called normal 
and seminormal, respectively. 
The semantics of a closed default theory (D, W) is based on the notion of 
extension, which is a possible state of the world according to the knowledge base. 
Formally, an extension is a fixed point of the operator I defined as follows. I(A) is 
the smallest set such that the following hold: 
1. wCr(A); 
2. rL4) = k4ru) t= d; 
3. if(a:p, ,..., &/r>ED, aEIYA),andc, ,&PA, then y~K4). 
A set of formulae E is an extension of (D, W) iff E = T(E). This definition is 
extended to open default theories by assuming that the defaults with free variables 
implicitly stand for the infinite set of closed defaults obtained by replacing the free 
variables with terms of the Herbrand universe of the default theory. 
The three computational problems that are most relevant in default logic, and 
that have been extensively studied in the literature, are deciding whether a default 
theory (D, W) has an extension, deciding whether a formula (Y belongs to at least 
one extension of (D, W) (also known as credulous default reasoning), and deciding 
whether (Y belongs to all the extensions (skeptical default reasoning). Notice that 
these are decision problems. 
Each extension E of (D, W) is identified by a subset D’ of D, called the set of 
generating defaults of E, having the property that E is the deductive closure of 
wu {Yl(X P1,...7&/r) ED’). 
The set of generating defaults gives a compact representation of an extension of a 
closed default theory, which by definition is a deductively closed set of formulae, 
hence infinite. The search problem of finding a set of generating defaults has also 
been studied from the computational point of view. 
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We would like to explain precisely the sources of complexity of default logic, 
focusing on the propositional case. A simple algorithm for deciding whether a 
formula S follows by credulous default reasoning from ( D, W > is as follows: 
for each subset D’ of D: 
do begin 
(* 0’ is potentially a set of generating defaults *) 
if D’ corresponds to an extension of (D, W > (* 1st test * 1 
then begin 
W’:= WU{rl(cy:P1,...,P,/r)~D’}. 
if w’F8 (* 2ndtest *> 




Since there are (21D’) subsets of D, the body of the for each loop could be executed 
an exponential number of times. As far as the computational cost of the body of 
the loop is concerned, the first test-according to the definition of extension given 
previously-requires us to perform several satisfiability and entailment checks for 
propositional formulae. Analogously, the second test requires an entailment check. 
As a consequence, each execution of the body of the loop requires most likely an 
exponential time. 
If nondeterministic omputations are considered, then the situation is different. 
As an example, it is possible to guess in parallel all the subsets D’ of D, and this 
can be done in polynomial time by a nondeterministic machine. Clearly we want 
such a machine to return true if at least me subset D’ satisfies the property in the 
loop. As far as the body of the loop is concerned, we saw in Section 2 that both 
satisfiability and entailment ests can be answered by NP machines. In other words, 
credulous default reasoning can be done by a nondeterministic polynomial Turing 
machine which guesses in parallel all the possible subsets of D’ of D and, for each 
subset, uses the answers given by an oracle. The oracle is in charge of performing 
the satisfiability and entailment checks required by the body of the loop, which are 
computations doable in nondeterministic polynomial time as well. It is clear from 
the definition of extension that for each subset D’ only a polynomial number of 
calls to the oracle are needed. 
The above argument can be made more formal and it shows that the problem of 
credulous default reasoning is in the class NP NP = C,P of the polynomial hierarchy. 
This establishes an upper bound, but it is of obvious practical interest to know 
whether (at least one of) the nondeterministic polynomial computations that we 
were referring to previously can be turned into deterministic polynomial ones, by 
means of smart search techniques. 
Gottlob in [64] and, independently, Stillman in [151] give a negative answer to 
this problem, by showing that credulous reasoning is Y,$-complete, that is, the 
hardest problem among those of the class Q. 
This result can be interpreted by saying that the source of complexity of 
consistency checking and that of the choice of the generating defaults are indepen- 
dent, and their interaction gives a problem which is complete for the second level 
of the polynomial hierarchy. This fact formalizes, for the propositional case, the 
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intuition that, if NP # X.$‘, default reasoning is computationally harder than mono- 
tonic reasoning, which is complete for the first level of the polynomial hierarchy. 
It is interesting to see explicitly Gottlob’s proof of C.$‘-hardness, in order to 
understand better the sources of complexity. The proof consists in a polynomial 
reduction from the problem of deciding the validity of a QBF,,, formula. 
Let Q = 3p, **. 3p,,Vq, *** Vq,G be an arbitrary QBF2,3 formula. Let (D,0> 
be a default theory, where 
All the possible truth assignments to pl,. . . , p, are in one-to-one correspondence 
with the extensions of (D,0>. Hence Q is valid iff there exists at least one 
extension of (D, 0) containing G, that is, if G follows from (D, 0) in a credulous 
way. This shows that validity of a QBF2 3 formula can be reduced to credulous 
default reasoning by means of a polynomial many-one reduction. 
We want to spend few words commenting on the above reduction. Extensions 
can be chosen in nondeterministic polynomial time (symbolized by the sequence of 
the existential quantifiers), but apparently not in deterministic polynomial time. An 
intuitive explanation of this fact is that defaults may interact in a combinatorial 
fashion, thus generating an exponential number of extensions. Moreover, even if a 
deterministic polynomial choice were possible, the complexity of the inference wrt 
the chosen extension should still be faced: it can be done in nondeterministic 
polynomial time (sequence of universal quantifiers), but apparently not in deter- 
ministic polynomial time. 
The above proof uses normal defaults without prerequisites. As a consequence, 
restricting to normal default theories does not help reduce the complexity of 
credulous reasoning. From the algorithmic point of view, normal default theories 
have been considered more promising, since they support goal-directed algorithms 
for credulous reasoning (see [129]), while the algorithms proposed for non-normal 
theories by Etherington in [50] and Zhang and Marek in [158] use an exponential 
amount of space to avoid nontermination. 
Skeptical default reasoning in the prerequisite-free normal case has been shown 
to be Il$‘-complete with a similar proof in [64] and 11511. In the same works, the 
problem of showing the existence of an extension has been proven to be X$-corn- 
plete for seminormal default theories (it becomes trivial for normal default 
theories which are guaranteed to have extensions). Papadimitriou and Sideri prove 
in [113] similar results for the last problem. 
Several researchers tudied restrictions of the expressiveness of default theories 
so that inference could be done in polynomial time. In particular restricted forms 
of the purely propositional part (the W), like Horn clausal form, 2CNF or ICNF, 
have been considered (2CNF formulae are conjunction of clauses of the form 
x vy, where x, y are literals; 1CNF formulae are just conjunction of literals). 
Generally speaking, restricting the expressiveness of the W is not useful from the 
computational point of view, since the complexity of default reasoning can 
be completely “hidden” in the default part: the default theories (D, W> and (D U 
{( : /W>),0) are equivalent. Therefore, the expressiveness of the default part 
must be limited as well, so that the nondeterministic hoice of the subsets of D 
that are to form a set of generating defaults can be turned into a deterministic one. 
This can be done by imposing conditions on the syntactic form of the defaults in 
order to control their interaction. 
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Let us analyze one such restriction that has been proposed, the so-called Horn 
default. In Horn defaults the prerequisite is a conjunction of positive atoms, the 
justification and the consequence are the same literal, that is the default has the 
form 
o: Y/Y 
Kautz and Selman [76] prove that, as long as W is 1CNF and credulous reasoning is 
concerned, a set of Horn defaults D can be mapped in linear time into a set of 
Horn clauses H so that the inference of a single literal x from (D, W > is 
equivalent to the inference of x from H, hence doable in linear time in I( D, W > I. 
In this case clearly the interaction among the defaults is not arbitrarily complex 
and can be easily controlled. As proven by Stillman [150], the hypothesis that W is 
1CNF cannot be fully relaxed, since if W is in Horn clausal form, then credulous 
reasoning is NP-complete. 
In [76] and [150] other examples of restrictions that lead to polynomially 
tractable cases are shown. Kautz and Selman [761 focus on default theories in 
which W is lCNF, finding results for all three decision problems and the search 
problem of default reasoning. It is interesting to notice that credulous and 
skeptical reasoning have different complexity, for example, skeptical reasoning of a 
single literal is co-NP-complete when W is 1CNF and D is Horn. 
Finding a set of defaults generating an extension has still a different complexity, 
and it is polynomial for some class in which both skeptical and credulous reasoning 
are intractable. Kautz and Selman, for example, analyze the case in which W is 
1CNF and D has only disjunction-free ordered defaults, which are strictly more 
expressive than Horn defaults. Orderedness is a property of defaults defined by 
Etherington [51], analogous to the idea of stratification in logic programming. A 
disjunction-free default has the form a, A a.. A a,:b, A ..a A b, A c1 A -.* A c,/b, 
A +.. A b,, where all ai, 4, and ck are literals. Finding an extension in this case 
has been proven [76] to be polynomial. This result has been improved by Papadim- 
itriou and Sideri [113], who show that some form of cycles in the defaults can be 
allowed. In particular, orderedness can be relaxed to a property that they call 
evenness, till having polynomiality. 
It is clear that finding a set of defaults generating an extension is at least as hard 
as proving the existence of an extension. The last problem is shown [76] to be 
NP-complete when W is 1CNF and D disjunction-free. This result is improved by 
Dimopoulos and Magirou [381, in which NP-completeness is shown for disjunction- 
free and prerequisite-free defaults. 
Kautz and Selman give also upper bounds for the complexity of default reason- 
ing, showing that as long as W is 1CNF and D is disjunction-free (the most general 
class they take into account) credulous reasoning and proving the existence of an 
extension are in NP, skeptical reasoning is in co-NP and finding an extension is in 
FA;, that is, it can be done by a polynomial machine which uses an NP oracle. 
These results confirm the intuitive complexity analysis that we gave before: The 
complexity of the consistency/entailment checking is always linear in lCNF-dis- 
junction-free default theories, hence the only source of complexity is the interac- 
tion of defaults. As a consequence, the decision problems are at the first level of 
the polynomial hierarchy. 
Stillman [150] tries to enhance the expressiveness of W, by allowing either 2CNF 
or Horn clauses, with disjunction-free defaults. For the reasons given before, the 
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upper bound of the four problems is not affected by this enhancement. He focuses 
on prerequisite-free defaults, showing for example that if the defaults are also 
normal and the W is 2CNF, then credulous reasoning is polynomial, while it is 
NP-complete if W is in Horn clausal form. 
Bidoit and Froidevaux [13] give results that complement Stillman’s, by showing 
that propositional logic programs can be translated into default theories whose W 
is Horn. If the program is stratified, then the resulting default theory has a unique 
extension which can be computed in polynomial time. Further polynomial cases 
can be obtained using the similar translations by Marek and Truszczyriski [94]. 
Dimopoulos and Magirou [38] obtain further results, by using a network repre- 
sentation of seminormal disjunction-free default theories. Using a graph-theoretic 
analysis they show that for theories without odd cycles in the associated graph, 
finding an extension can be done in polynomial time. This class generalizes the 
class of disjunction-free ordered theories, thus improving the previous results in 
L’61. 
Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [9, 101 propose a different technique for performing 
default reasoning: translating a default theory (D, W) into a propositional theory 
L?’ so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the models of L?J and the 
extensions of (D, W). As proven by the results of [64] and [151], a transformation 
of this kind cannot in general be done in polynomial time unless XCg = NP. Actually 
the size of 9, according to the transformation of [lo], is exponential in the size of 
(D, W). Nevertheless, there are subcases in which the size of L? is polynomial wrt 
the size of the default theory. The most important such case shown in [lo] concerns 
the class of 2-default theories, in which W is 2CNF, the prerequisite of each default 
is in 2CNF, each justification is in 2DNF, and the conclusion is a clause of size 2. 
Using this reduction, Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter prove that the three decision 
problems are either NP-complete or co-NP-complete for this class of default 
theories. Furthermore, each subclass of 2-default theories that translates into a 
tractable subclass of propositional satisfiability is a tractable subset of default logic. 
Two such subclasses are shown in [lo]. 
With respect to default theories in which first-order formulae occur, it is worth 
remembering that a default of the form ( : p(x>/p(x>) where x is a variable, is 
actually an abbreviation for the infinite set of defaults ( : p(t)/p(t>), where t is a 
term of the Herbrand universe of the default theory. 
Apart from the results by Reiter [129], who showed that credulous default 
reasoning is not r.e., few results on the complexity of fully first-order default 
reasoning have appeared. Reiter proved also that, as long as closed normal default 
theories built on decidable fragments of first-order logic are concerned, decidabil- 
ity of credulous reasoning is guaranteed. When open defaults are considered, this 
is no longer true: Baader and Hollunder [71 showed that credulous default 
reasoning is undecidable for default theories built on a decidable fragment of 
first-order logic and containing a finite number of open defaults. Apt and Blair [51 
performed an analysis on complexity of negation in logic programs, giving some 
results on default logic by using the existing correspondences between the two 
formalisms. In particular, they show that skeptical and creduluous inference of 
ground atoms is, for all finite n, hard wrt the class Zt of the arithmetic hierarchy, 
hence strictly harder than first-order inference. These results hold for finite 
first-order W and for infinite D, in the sense specified above. In Section 5 we give 
more details about the results of Apt and Blair. 
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Marek, Nerode, and Remmel [91] give recursion-theoretic results on a non- 
monotonic formalism that generalizes default logic. 
We now briefly mention results on variants of default logic. The complexity of 
model-preference default logic, introduced by Kautz and Selman [1421, has been 
analyzed by the same authors as well as Papadimitriou [112] and Cadoli [24]. The 
complexity of another variant, known as default logic with stationary extensions 
introduced by Przymusinksa and Przymusinsky [120], has been analyzed by Gottlob 
[631. 
A computationally appealing alternative to default logic is based on the use of 
probabilistic semantics. For a general survey on the topic we refer the reader to 
Pearl’s paper [116]. In this setting, default rules implicitly define a preference 
ordering (ranking) among sentences that is used to infer conclusions. This different 
reading has a stronger causal content than classical default logic. Computationally, 
this results in a more tractable system. In fact, the problem of deciding whether a 
formula follows from a conditional knowledge base is in A$‘. This is due to the 
simpler interaction between defaults which can be accommodated using only a 
polynomial number of calls to a satisfiability tester. As a consequence, restricting 
the attention to base languages where satisfiability can be checked in polynomial 
time (e.g., Horn clauses) delivers polynomial deduction tasks (see the works of 
Goldszmidt and Pearl [62]). 
We would like to conclude this section by summarizing the results previously 
presented. Propositional default reasoning is in some formal sense strictly harder 
than classical propositional reasoning. Apparently it has two independent sources 
of complexity (selection of an appropriate set of generating defaults, and consis- 
tency/entailment checks) whose interaction leads to problems complete for the 
second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Many successful attempts at finding 
polynomially tractable subcases have been proposed, and all of them attack both 
sources of complexity at the same time. 
Algorithms for performing default reasoning have been presented by Reiter 
11291, Etherington 1501, Zhang and Marek [158], Schwind [141], and Poole et al. 
[117l. Algorithms described in [129], [50], and [158] use satisfiability testers as 
subroutines. 
4. MODAL NON-MONOTONIC LOGICS 
In this section we review complexity results presented in the literature concerning 
non-monotonic versions of modal logics, with special attention to the best known of 
such logics, autoepistemic logic with all its variants. We consider a propositional 
language augmented by the modal operator L. 
Historically, the first non-monotonic modal logic was the Non-monotonic Logic 
(NM1 in the sequel) introduced by McDermott and Doyle [lOl, 1001. This logic has 
been refined by Moore [1041, who defined autoepistemic logic. In autoepistemic 
logic the semantics of a set of modal formulae A (called premises) is given by stable 
expansions which are hxpoints of the following equation: 
A={alAuLAU ~Lh=a}, 
where Lb,=lLplp~A] and -ILE=~TLPIPEAI. 
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Stable expansions in autoepistemic logic have the same role played by exten- 
sions in default logic. Analogously to default logic, the main reasoning tasks are 
deciding if a set of premises has a stable expansion, if a formula LY belongs to at 
least one stable expansion of a set of premises (credulous autoepistemic reasoning), 
and if a formula belongs to all stable expansions of a set of premises (skeptical 
autoepistemic reasoning). 
There is a close correlation between the interpretation of 7 La in autoepis- 
temic logic and the meaning of not (Y in logic programming, where not denotes 
negation as failure. This analogy has been stressed and used by Gelfond [56] to 
define the iterative fixed-point semantics and by Gelfond and Lifschitz [57] to 
define the stable model semantics for logic programs with negation. 
An issue of obvious computational interest concerns the compact representation 
of stable expansions, which is analogous to the issue of a compact representation of 
an extension of a default theory. As shown by Konolige [79], any set of premises A 
can be transformed into an equivalent one A’ which is composed of formulae fi of 
the kind 
Lq A -l LB,’ A -*a A 7 Lpi” -+ y,, 
where ai,@:,... , pin, -yi are formulae not containing the modal operator L. When 
formulae are in this syntactic form, then subsets of A’ can play the same role that 
generating defaults have in default logic. Unfortunately, the process of transform- 
ing arbitrary formulae into this form may exponentially increase their size. For this 
reason Niemela [lo81 and Shvarts [147] have proposed methods which extract 
directly from A kernels, that is, sets of subformulae of A which are in one-to-one 
relation with stable expansions. 
The complexity results for the general case are the following. The problem of 
deciding whether a set of premises A has a stable expansion is ‘C,P-complete, 
credulous autoepistemic reasoning is also IQ-complete, while skeptical autoepis- 
temic reasoning is II&‘-complete. The upper bounds have been proven by Niemela 
[lo81 and the lower bounds by Gottlob [64]. 
Notice that these results are exactly the same as those already shown for default 
logic. Since all problems complete for the same class of the polynomial hierarchy 
can be polynomially reduced one to the other, it is clear that, for example, 
credulous default reasoning is polynomially reducible to credulous autoepistemic 
reasoning. More precisely, the existence of a polynomial mapping .H from the 
problem of deciding credulous inference of a formula y from a default theory 
(D,W) into the problem of credulous inference of another formula S from a set 
of premises A is guaranteed. The existence of an inverse mapping ’ is guaran- 
teed as well. 
This may seem in contradiction with the negative results obtained by Konolige 
[79], and by Marek and Truszczyriski in [95], where they could not find an 
embedding of default logic in classical autoepistemic logic, but only in some of its 
variants. This contradiction is only apparent; in fact they were interested in 
translations satisfying some condition of locality, in which a single default rule is 
mapped into a modal formula. Transformation like &, J’ do not necessarily 
satisfy locality. A more detailed analysis of the various translations proposed for 
different NMR formalisms is presented in Section 8. 
As in the case of default reasoning, restricting the expressiveness of the 
language may lead to a decrease of the complexity. For example, Marek and 
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Truszczynski have shown [97] that deciding whether an atom is member of one 
expansion of a set of premises of the form: 
La, A e-e A La,, A 7 Lb, A ... A 7 Lb,,, + c, 
where a,, . . . , a,,, b,, . . . , b,, c are literals, is NP-complete while membership to all 
expansions is co-NP-complete. In a recent paper Niemela and Rintanen [109] show 
that restricting the attention to stratified autoepistemic theories, a class defined by 
Marek and Truszczyi%i [97] in the style of stratified logic programs, it is possible 
to greatly reduce the computational complexity of all the decision problems. In 
particular, they show that for stratified autoepistemic theories the only source of 
complexity is given by the satisfiability checking in the underlying propositional 
language; hence, when this check can be done in polynomial time (e.g., Horn 
clauses), then all the decision problems are polynomially tractable. 
Although there are no other direct results on the complexity of autoepistemic 
inference, other complexity results can be obtained by means of the techniques 
described in Section 8, using the translations from default logic [65, 871 and logic 
programs [57, 931 into autoepistemic logic. 
In the rest of this section we deal with several variants of autoepistemic logic 
that have been proposed in the literature. 
A more complex variant is the moderately grounded autoepistemic logic intro- 
duced by Konolige [79]. A stable expansion T is moderately grounded if and only if 
there is no other stable expansion T’ such that the part of T’ with no occurrence 
of L is strictly contained in that of T. This minimality requirement for T can be 
checked by nondeterministically selecting a T’ and checking whether the condition 
holds, but this obviously adds one further level of nondeterminism to the computa- 
tion. Eiter and Gottlob [46] show that it cannot be eliminated by proving that 
credulous reasoning wrt moderately grounded expansions is X,P-complete and 
skeptical reasoning is IIf-complete. 
Autoepistemic logic is a refinement of the non-monotonic logic NM1 introduced 
by McDermott and Doyle [lOl, 1001. NM1 is based on a fixpoint construction 
slightly different from the one used in autoepistemic logic. Given the analogies of 
NM1 with autoepistemic logic, it is not surprising that the decision problems of 
NM1 have the same complexity of the corresponding problems of autoepistemic 
logic, see Niemell [108] (upper bounds) and Gottlob [64] (lower bounds). 
Using the lixpoint construction of McDermott and Doyle but changing the 
underlying modal system, Marek and Truszczyi& [95] and Marek, Shvarts, and 
Truszczynski [921 present a whole new family of non-monotonic modal systems. The 
complexity analysis of these systems has shown that for most of them all the 
decision problems lie at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy <C.j’- or 
II,“-complete) even when underlying modal systems of different complexity are 
used. A result worth mentioning is due to Schwarz and Truszczynski [140], where 
they show that skeptical reasoning is the non-monotonic modal logic S4 is 
IQ-complete. This is somehow surprising since reasoning in the monotonic modal 
system S4 is PSPACE-complete as proven by Ladner [82]. Marek, Shvarts, and 
Truszczynski [92] and Gottlob [64] give’other interesting complexity results. 
As far as first-order languages are concerned, we want to point out that in the 
original paper by Moore [104] only propositional languages are allowed. By the 
way, Konolige [79l allows the modal operator to be applied to closed formulae of 
first-order logic. Under this restriction, Niemell proves [108] that whenever the 
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satisfiability test in the underlying first-order language is decidable so are all the 
reasoning tasks of autoepistemic logic. 
5. NEGATION IN LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
In this section we survey the complexity results for the various semantics for 
negation in logic programming. This is not intended as an overview of such 
semantics and their relative merits; a detailed and interesting discussion on this 
issue can be found in the survey paper by Bidoit [12] and in the paper by Schlipf 
[1381. We will only marginally refer to the huge body of literature on complexity in 
rule-based database languages (DATALOG), since this survey focuses on the logic 
programming semantics more directly related to NMR. For a survey on logic 
programming and databases we refer the reader to the book by Ceri, Gottlob, and 
Tanca [30]. 
We survey the perfect model, stable model, default model, well-founded, sup- 
ported model, positivistic, inflationary semantics, and the program completion. The 
expressive power of the various semantics has been studied and compared exten- 
sively. For an analysis of this issue see, for example, the work of Schlipf [137]. All 
these semantics are extensions of the classical minimal model semantics of positive 
logic programs, and they all agree on the class of stratified and locally stratified 
logic programs, with exception made for the supported and inflationary semantics 
and the program completion. 
Due to lack of space, this survey will necessarily be incomplete. For a more 
complete survey on complexity and undecidability results on logic programming we 
recommend the excellent paper of Schlipf [139]. 
In the field of logic programming the most important inference task is deciding 
whether a ground atom belongs to the (usually unique) preferred model of a 
program. This is the reasoning task we will be referring to in the sequel, where not 
otherwise specified. 
First of all let us recall the main results on the complexity of logic programs 
without negation. In this case, the preferred model is the unique least Herbrand 
model. For propositional languages reasoning under such a model can be done in 
linear time using Dowling and Gallier’s algorithm 1401. When dealing with first-order 
languages, membership of positive and negative literals in the least Herbrand 
model of a Horn program has been shown to be r.e.-complete and co-r.e.-complete, 
respectively, by Smullyan [148] and by Andreka and Nemeti [2]. 
For a first-order language, when negation is allowed there are two different 
membership problems, depending on which sets of models we are interested in. 
Traditionally, the semantics of logic programs is given in terms of Herbrand 
models; however, in some works (e.g., Kunen’s paper [Sll> it is assumed that 
models are interpretations over a larger universe containing an infinite number of 
constants as well as function symbols. As already pointed out by Blair [161, the 
second alternative leads, in general, to computationally simpler problems. Where 
not otherwise indicated, we implicitly deal with Herbrand models. 
We now analyze the complexity of reasoning tasks in stratified programs. From 
the computational point of view, these results apply to all the semantics, again with 
the exception of supported semantics, inflationary semantics, and program comple- 
tion. In this case it is well known that the unique preferred model of a stratified 
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program can be computed incrementally through the strata by first assigning truth 
values to the atoms in the lowest stratum and then moving on to the next ones [6]. 
This holds for locally stratified programs as well. This procedure converges to the 
iterated least model as defined by Apt, Blair, and Walker [61. For a propositional 
language, this immediately implies tractability of the computation, since the 
computations performed at each step are polynomial and the number of strata is at 
most linear in the size of the program. Notice also that deciding whether a 
first-order program is stratified can be done in polynomial time [6], while deciding 
whether a program is locally stratified is undecidable, as proven by Cholak [33]. 
The perfect model semantics, introduced by Przymusinski [121], uses the syntac- 
tic form of the program to infer a preferential relation on the models. The 
semantics is not defined for all programs, but for a strict superset of the class of 
locally stratified programs. 
Apt and Blair [5] have proven that if P is a stratified program with IZ strata, 
then deciding membership in the perfect model of P is C,“. Furthermore, for each 
n 2 1, there is a stratified program P with n strata for which the same problem is 
Cz-complete. This result can be specialized to the case of recursion-free programs, 
in which the problem is r.e. The more general class of locally stratified programs 
turns out to be computationally more complex. In fact, membership is A\-complete 
over w, as shown by Cholak and Blair [32] and by Blair, Marek, and Schlipf [17]. A 
further class of programs that has been analyzed is the class of acyclic programs. 
For this class of programs Apt and Bezem have proven [4] that deciding member- 
ship of ground atoms in the perfect model is a decidable task. The class of acyclic 
programs is a proper subset of the class of locally stratified ones, and checking 
acyclicity of a program is a II:-complete problem. 
Using the translations from default logic and circumscription given by Bidoit 
and Froidevaux [13] and Lifschitz [86], Apt and Blair [5] show that Xi-hardness is a 
lower bound for ground inference in restricted classes of default and circumscrip- 
tive theories. 
For general propositional programs, Eiter and Gottlob prove [42] that deciding 
whether a perfect model exists is co-NP-hard, while deciding whether a model of a 
program is perfect is co-NP-complete. 
The stable model and default model semantics have been independently intro- 
duced by Gelfond and Lifschitz [57] and Bidoit and Froidevaux [13]. While the first 
is based on autoepistemic logic, the second is based on default logic. As it turned 
out, these two semantics are equivalent. Since for stratified programs they also 
coincide with the perfect model semantics, we only consider general programs. 
Three problems have been analyzed in the propositional case: deciding the exis- 
tence of a stable model has been proven NP-complete by Marek and Truszczynski 
1961 and independently by Bidoit and Froidevaux [14]. In [97] Marek and Truszczyn- 
ski prove that deciding whether an atom is a member of one stable model is 
NP-complete and membership in all stable models is co-NP-complete. 
The supported model semantics has been introduced by Apt, Blair, and Walker 
[6] to declaratively capture the behavior of PROLOG interpreters. Marek and 
Truszczynski have shown [96, 971 that deciding the existence of a supported model 
is an NP-complete problem, membership of an atom in one supported model is 
also NP-complete, and membership in all supported models is co-NP-complete. A 
variant of the supported model semantics is the positivistic model semantics 
introduced by Bidoit and Hull [15]. Schaerf shows [134] that deciding whether a 
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formula is true in one positivistic model is a X.$-complete problem, while deciding 
whether a formula is true in all the positivistic models is II&‘-complete. 
Differently from the previous semantics, the well-founded semantics, introduced 
by Van Gelder, Ross, and Schlipf 11541, is based on three-valued or partial models. 
Partial models do not necessarily assign the values true or false to all atoms, but 
may leave someone undefined. Well-founded semantics always provides a unique 
preferred model (called well-founded model) to any program; furthermore, if the 
program is stratified, the well-founded model is completely defined (not partial). 
The well-founded model of any propositional program can be computed in polyno- 
mial time [154]. 
When a first-order language is used, the computational differences between 
stable and well-founded model semantics disappear. In fact the problem of decid- 
ing membership in all stable (well-founded) models turns out to be II;-complete 
over o for both Herbrand models and models over larger universes, as shown by 
Schlipf [137, 1391 and Van Gelder [153]. Two other problems have been considered 
by Marek, Nerode, and Remmel. In [911 they show that for the class of programs 
admitting a unique stable model, the membership problem is still II:-complete 
over o; in [90] they prove that deciding whether a program has a stable model is a 
Xi-complete problem over w. Furthermore, Marek and Subrahmanian show [93] 
that deciding whether a model is a stable model of a program P is Hi-hard and is 
in II!. 
As far as the predicate completion defined by Clark [35] is concerned, for 
propositional anguages it has been proven by Kolaitis and Papadimitriou [78] that 
deciding whether a ground atom belongs to the completion of a program is a 
co-NP-complete problem. If quantification and function symbols are introduced, 
then the membership problem over Herbrand models is @complete over w and 
over models with larger universes is r.e.-complete. 
We do not have the space to refer all the complexity results in the DATALOG 
area, but we still want to mention the works of Kolaitis and Papadimitriou [78] and 
Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 11141. In their analysis, Kolaitis and Papadimitriou 
take into account DATALOG’ programs, that is, DATALOG programs with 
negation and with a finite universe, and give two semantics for it. The first is given 
as the hxpoint of a natural consequence operator. The data-complexity, that is, 
complexity wrt a fixed extensional database, of finding a fixpoint is NP-complete 
and finding a least fixpoint is in FA! (for a more precise characterization see [78]). 
In order to overcome these computational imitations, Kolaitis and Papadimitriou 
introduce the inflationary semantics, which is based on an iterative construction 
rather than a hxpoint one. Inflationary semantics, as the well-founded semantics, is 
defined for all programs and its data-complexity is polynomial. 
This analysis has been further developed by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis. The 
main issue addressed in the paper is to find a semantics whose data complexity is 
polynomial and which extends the well-founded semantics. The proposed seman- 
tics, the tie-breaking semantics, is in some provable sense more general than the 
well-founded semantics and can be computed in polynomial time. In the same 
paper they also show that proving whether a tixpoint model exists for any extension 
of the EDB is undecidable. 
An extension of logic programming which has been well analyzed from the 
computational point of view is disjunctive logic programming, where disjunctions of 
literals are allowed in the head of the rules. For a comprehensive survey of the 
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semantical and computational aspects of disjunctive logic programming, we refer to 
the book by Lobe, Minker, and Rajasekar [88]. Due to lack of space we can only 
briefly mention the major results and give pointers to the literature. Most of the 
semantics for negation in logic programs have been extended to deal with disjunc- 
tive logic programs. In particular, Przymusinski [124] introduces the disjunctive 
stable model semantics, which extends the stable model semantics, and the partial 
disjunctive stable model semantics, which extends the well-founded semantics. 
Eiter and Gottlob in [42] have analyzed the complexity of these and other 
semantics. In particular they show that deciding whether a literal is true in all the 
preferred models of a disjunctive logic program under the perfect model semantics 
and the (partial) disjunctive stable model semantics is a II$-complete problem. A 
different extension of the stable model semantics has been given by Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [58] through the notion of answer set. While inference has been shown to 
be a problem complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, see Eiter 
and Gottlob [44], nevertheless ome classes have been shown to be computationally 
simpler by Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter in [ll], where they show a polynomial 
mapping from a subclass of disjunctive logic programs into a propositional theory. 
Another semantics, called disjunctive database rule, has been defined by Ross and 
Topor [132] and it has been shown to be polynomially tractable by Chan [31]. Chan 
has also extended this rule to the possible worlds semantics, which correctly 
handles negative clauses. However, literal inference under this new semantics is 
co-NP-complete [31, 421. 
6. CIRCUMSCRIPTION AND CLOSED-WORLD REASONING 
Circumscription has been defined by McCarthy [98] and refined later by McCarthy 
himself [99] and by Lifschitz [85]. We refer to the definition which can be found in 
[99] and [85]. Let T[P; Z] be a first-order formula in which at least the predicates 
of the disjoint lists of predicates P and Z occur. The circumscription CZK(T; P; Z) 
of the predicates P in T[ P; Zl with varying predicates Z is the following second-order 
formula: 
T[P;Z] A (VP’Z’.T[P’;Z’] --) 7(P’<P)), (1) 
where P’Z’ is a list of predicates isomorphic to PZ and T[ P’; Z’l is T with all the 
occurrences of predicates of PZ substituted by the corresponding ones in P’Z’. 
The meaning of P’ < P is defined in terms of the relation 5 . In particular, P’ <P 
is (P’ I P) A 7 (P I P’), and P’ I P stands for the conjunction of the formulae 
(vzp;( q -+Pi( 2)) 
for each pi in P. In the above formula pi pi are corresponding predicates, and x’ is 
an appropriate list of variables. The predicates occurring in P are called mini- 
mized, while those not occurring in PZ are denoted with Q and are called fixed. 
The closed-world assumption (CWA) of a first-order formula T is the following 
formula, defined by Reiter [128]: 
OVA(T) =Tu{q~lT#p}, (2) 
where p is a ground atom. This rule has been refined by several authors: Minker 
[102] introduced the generalized CWA, Rajasekar, Lobo, and Minker [126], the 
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weak generalized CWA; Yahya and Henschen [156], the extended generalized CWA; 
Gelfond and Przymusinska [59] the careful CWA, Gelfond, Przymusinsky, and 
Przymusinska [601, the extended CWA and the iterated CWA. The notion of fixed 
and varying predicates has been used in the careful, in the extended and in the 
iterated CWA. Extended CWA is the most general of all the above rules and is 
defined as follows: 
ECWA(T;P;Q;Z) =TU{7Kl3B.(TktB) A(TbYVB)}, (3) 
where ( P; Q; 2 > is a partition of the predicate symbols of T in minimized/ fixed/ 
varying ones, K is any formula not involving letters from Z, and B is a disjunction 
of ground literals whose predicate symbols come from Q and positive ground 
literals whose predicate symbols come from P. The formulae K whose negations 
are added to T in the above formula are called free for negation. 
Relationships between circumscription, closed-world reasoning, and Clark’s [35] 
negation as failure rule have been very well studied in the literature by many 
researchers, see for example Reiter [130], Sheperdson 11461, Lifschitz [841, and in 
all the works defining closed-world rules. In particular, it has been shown that an 
abstract notion of minimality underlies definitions (11, (2), and (3). In the proposi- 
tional case, formulae (1) and (3) are equivalent (see 1601). 
6.1. Inference 
Several computational tasks for circumscription and closed-world reasoning have 
been addressed from the point of view of the complexity. Inference, that is, to 
decide whether a first-order formula logically follows from formulae (1) or (31, is 
the first one we survey. 
Circumscription is a second-order formula, and second-order logic is well-known 
to be computationally strictly harder than first-order logic (see, for example, van 
Benthem and Doets 11521). In fact circumscription appears to be more expressive 
than first-order logic, as noticed by Lifschitz. In [84] he shows that second-order 
formulae like transitive closure, which are not collapsible to first-order ones, are 
expressible as the circumscription of a first-order formula. 
This fact does not per se show that circumscription is strictly harder than 
first-order logic. Nevertheless there have been many attempts at finding classes of 
first-order formulae whose circumscription is (equivalent to) a first-order formula. 
From the computational point of view, results of this kind show classes of 
circumscription in which inference is a r.e. problem. 
One of the classes (called of separable formulae) has been defined by Lifschitz 
in [85]. The class of separable formulae is based on a generalization of the idea of 
predicate completion by Clark 1351 and contains all quantifier-free formulae. This 
result has been improved by Rabinov [1251, who showed a class of collapsible 
formulae that subsumes eparable formulae In both cases collapsibility is guaran- 
teed only when three are no varying predicates, that is Z = 0. 
Kolaitis and Papadimitriou 1771 investigated the fragment of existentially quanti- 
fied formulae, showing that their circumscription is first-order even if varying 
predicates are allowed. 
All the conditions that imply collapsibility are sufficient and not necessary, and 
the complexity of deciding whether a given formula is in one of the above 
collapsible cases is in general not known. Actually, the task of proving collapsibility 
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has been proven to be undecidable by Krishnaprasad [801 for general first-order 
formulae, and by Kolaitis and Papadimitriou for logic programs [77]. 
All the above results seem to suggest hat circumscriptive inference is harder 
than first-order inference. Actually, Cadoli, Eiter, and Gottlob proved [251 that 
inference of a formula y from a circumscription is as hard as testing the validity of 
any formula in second-order logic. 
It is interesting to notice that the last result holds even when y is propositional, 
regardless of the presence of varying and/or fixed predicates. The fact that fixed 
predicates do not contribute to the complexity of circumscription was proved by de 
Kleer and Konolige [37]. On the other hand the fact that varying predicates do not 
affect the complexity may seem surprising, in view of the fact that the algorithms 
for circumscription that have been proposed (for example, Przymusinski’s in [122]) 
are more efficient when varying predicates are not allowed. In the following we will 
see that the presence of fixed/varying predicates may affect the complexity of 
inference for some restricted class of formulae. 
Other interesting results have been obtained by Schlipf [135], who focused on 
countably infinite models of formula (1). In particular he shows that, when 
inference is restricted to such models, then the problem of deciding whether a 
first-order formula follows from (1) is complete for the class II: of the analytical 
hierarchy over the integers. It is interesting to notice that this result holds even if 
Z = 0. 
In [5] Apt and Blair showed a lower bounds of X:-hardness for any finite n 
when ground inference in stratified logic programs is concerned. They take into 
account a slightly more general version of the formula (1) called prioritized 
circumscription, defined by Lifschitz [85]. 
As far as the propositional version of (1) is concerned, Eiter and Gottlob showed 
[411 that the inference problem (with Q = 0, 2 = 0 or not) is complete for the 
class II.$ of the polynomial hierarchy. In [42] they give a more tight result, showing 
that &‘-completeness holds even if formulae T with no negative clauses are 
considered. Comparing this result to those in Section 3, we can say that the 
minimality requirement imposed by circumscription gives a further level of nonde- 
terminism which is analogous to the choice of the right set of defaults. As a 
consequence a propositional circumscriptive reasoner and a propositional skeptical 
default reasoner have exactly the same computational power. In Section 8 we see 
that many researchers attempted at finding analogous relations between the two 
formalisms. 
Papalaskari and Weinstein [ 1151 analyzed the infinitary propositional (senten- 
tial) case of circumscription. They showed that when the underlying propositional 
language is countable and there are neither fixed nor varying predicates, then 
inference is a problem in II: and not in I: i. It is worth recalling that inference in 
sentential ogic is r.e. 
Cadoli and Lenzerini [261 studied the complexity of circumscriptive inference for 
eight classes of (finite> propositional formulae in which monotonic inference is 
polynomial. In such a case the upper bound for inference is co-NP. 
When the inferred formula y is a clause, then the problem is co-NP-complete 
for very restricted cases, for example, when T is both Horn and 2CNF or when T is 
2CNF and only positive literals occur in it. The only polynomial case found is when 
T is Horn, 2CNF, and with no clauses of the form 7 x v 7 y. Further polynomial 
cases have been found for restricted versions of the inference problem, for example 
when T is Horn and Q = 0, or when T is 2CNF, y is a literal, and 2 = 0. 
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It is interesting to notice that, while for the general propositional case clause 
inference is not any harder than literal inference, and fixed/varying letters do not 
add complexity to inference, this is not the case for restricted cases. As an example, 
Cadoli and Lenzerini show several cases in which literal inference is polynomial 
and clause inference is co-NP-complete. A similar tradeoff exists when either 
Q=0orZ=0. 
One source of complexity of circumscriptive inference seems to be the number 
of free for negation formulae in (31, which is potentially exponential. Actually, in 
all the polynomial cases found in [261, it has been shown that only a polynomial 
number of free for negation formulae has to be taken into account. 
Given the equivalence of circumscription and extended closed-world reasoning 
in the propositional case, the same results hold for the extended CWA as well. For 
what concerns other forms of closed-world inference, Cadoli and Lenzerini show in 
the same work that many intractable cases for the extended CWA are tractable for 
other definitions. As an example, careful closed-world reasoning (defined in [59]) is 
polynomial for 2CNF formulae. This can be explained by observing that the 
definition of careful CWA is (3) with K restricted to be a single positive literal. As 
a consequence the space of the potential free for negation formulae is linear in the 
size of the input. In view of this fact, it is interesting to notice that Eiter and 
Gottlob proved [411 that careful closed-world inference is IQ-hard, while the best 
upper bound is Pz~[o(‘Og ‘)I, which is worse than the upper bound of II{ that holds 
for extended closed-world inference. 
Other authors have studied the complexity of closed-world inference. Apt and 
Blair have proven [5] that reasoning under the closed-world assumption (2) is 
II:-complete when T is a logic program. Apt [3] had previously shown that the task 
is polynomial for propositional Horn formulae. The same bounds hold for the weak 
generalized CWA defined in [126]. 
Weak generalized CWA has also been studied by Chan [31], who proved that 
literal inference is polynomial for propositional formulae with no negative clauses. 
This has also been noticed by Cadoli and Lenzerini [261. If negative clauses are 
allowed, then co-NP-hardness holds (see [311). 
As far as the inference under the CWA in an unrestricted propositional 
language is concerned, Eiter and Gottlob [41] show a lower bound of NP-hardness 
and an upper bound of P NP[o(‘og ‘)I. 
In a more recent paper 1421, Eiter and Gottlob analyzed iterated CWA, which is 
a variant of extended CWA defined in [60], showing II,“-completeness results 
analogous to those obtained for extended CWA. 
Chomicki and Subrahmanian analyzed [341 the complexity of generalized 
closed-world inference for logic programs. The generalized CWA (see [1021) is the 
rule (3) when Q = Z = 0 and K is a positive ground literal. The main result of [341 
is that inference of a ground atom under the generalized CWA is complete for the 
class II!j of the arithmetic hierarchy. 
Borgida and Etherington [18] have shown a very specialized language for 
representing taxonomies in which some form of generalized closed-world reasoning 
is polynomial. 
The complexity of closed-world reasoning in relational databases has been 
studied by many authors, for example, Vardi 11551. The problems addressed are 
outside the scope of this survey, and we refer to the book by Grahne 1671 for a 
general overview. 
Several algorithms for inferencing under circumscription have been proposed: 
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Przymusinski [122], Ginsberg [61], Inoue and Helft [73], Bossu and Siegel [19l, 
Olivetti [llO], and Bell et al. [S, 1071. Each of them presupposes languages of 
limited expressiveness. The algorithms in [1221, [731, and [llOl use satisfiability 
testers as subroutines. 
6.2. Satisjiability 
Satisfiability is another computational task that has been addressed. It is well-known 
that both the circumscription of a first-order formula T and its closure (2) could be 
unsatisfiable even if T is satisfiable. On the other hand, the extended closure 
preserves consistency. 
Schlipf proved [135] that deciding whether the formula (1) has a countably 
infinite model is zi-complete over the integers. 
Eiter and Gottlob [41] proved a lower bound of NP-hardness and an upper 
bound of PNP[‘(‘og ‘)I for consistency checking of the CWA of an arbitrary proposi- 
tional formula. 
These results complement some other by Schlipf, who proved 11361 that consis- 
tency checking of a slightly different version of the CWA is both NP-hard and 
co-NP-hard and is in A$. 
6.3. Model Checking 
Kolaitis and Papadimitriou [771 noticed that the complexity of circumscription 
seems to arise even in the problem of model checking. Model checking is the 
problem of deciding whether a finite structure satisfies a given formula q. If q is 
first-order, then the task is polynomial. On the other hand, in [771 it is shown that 
when W is the formula (11, then the task is co-NP-complete. The result holds when 
T is a universal-existential first-order sentence and Z # 0. co-NP is actually the 
upper bound for the model checking of the circumscription of all first-order 
formulae T. 
Cadoli [23] strengthens this result in several directions, by proving co-NP-hard- 
ness of model checking when the formula T to be circumscribed is propositional, 
satisfiable, and Q = Z = 0; co-NP-hardness in the case Z = 0 is implicit in the 
work of Schlipf [136]. 
In the same work [23], Cadoli shows several polynomial subcases, for example, 
when T is a Horn or 2CNF propositional formula. The complexity analysis has 
been carried out by examining subcases in which Q and/or Z are the empty set. In 
some interesting cases the task is polynomial if Q = 0, and co-NP-complete 
otherwise. Some polynomial cases are also shown by Eiter and Gottlob [41]. 
It is interesting to notice that propositional circumscription is in co-NP if model 
checking is polynomial (see [26]). 
Polynomiality of the task when T is a first-order logic program has been shown 
by Kolaitis and Papadimitriou [77]. 
6.4. Model Finding 
Papadimitriou [112] addressed the issue of finding a satisfying truth assignment for 
the formula (1) when T is propositional. Notice that model finding is a search 
problem. 
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The upper bound of the analogous task for plain propositional logic is FA& 
hence a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle is sufficient. Gottlob and 
Fermiiller prove [66] that unless P = NP a logarithmic number of calls to an oracle 
in NP is necessary. 
Papadimitriou proves that, if minimal satisfying truth assignments are searched, 
then a polynomial number of calls is still sufficient. 
Cadoli [24] addresses the case in which Q = Z = 0, proving that the task is 
FPNP[‘(“g ““-hard, even if T is in CNF and a satisfying truth assignment of T is 
kllOWIl. 
7. ABDUCTION 
Abduction is the process of finding explanations for observations in a given theory. 
This abstract characterization has led to several different definitions of abduction 
in the literature, which can be roughly divided into two main areas: logic-based 
abduction as defined by Selman and Levesque [144], and set-covering methods as 
defined by Reggia, Nau, and Wang in [127]. Although the two methods look 
formally different, strong connections have been pointed out by Bylander [21] and 
by Friedrich, Gottlob and Nejdl [53]. In this paper we focus on logic-based 
abduction, since it has been shown to be tightly related to negation in logic 
programming (see, for example, Eshghi and Kowalski [49] and Kakas and Mancar- 
ella [75]) and default logic (see [144]). Furthermore, we only consider propositional 
languages, since very little is known about first-order abduction. 
Logic-based abduction has been defined as follows [144]: Given a set of proposi- 
tional clauses Z and a letter q, an aplunation for q is a set of literals (Y such that 
(1) I: U a k q, (2) c U a is consistent, and (3) (Y is minimal wrt set inclusion. 
Notice that a trivial explanation satisfying requirements (1) and (3) is q itself. All 
explanations not containing q will be called nontrivial. A condition sometimes 
imposed on explanations is that the set (Y must be a subset of a predefined set of 
literals A which represent the plausible hypotheses. Explanations satisfying this 
condition are called assumption-bused xplanations in [144]. 
There are at least three decision tasks which have been considered in the 
various works on abduction: deciding whether an explanation exists at all, deciding 
whether an individual hypothesis h EA belong to at least one acceptable explana- 
tion (credulous abductive reasoning), and deciding whether an individual hypothe- 
sis h E A belongs to all the acceptable xplanations (skeptical abductive reasoning). 
The search problem of finding one (best) explanation has also been studied. 
The most comprehensive work on the complexity of logic-based abduction has 
been done by Eiter and Gottlob [47]. In this paper, they analyze the complexity of 
all the above problems under different preference criteria. In particular they show 
that when no restrictions are imposed on the syntactic form of the theory 2 and no 
preference criterion is specified, then all the problems are complete for the second 
level of the polynomial hierarchy. Adding the requirement of minimality wrt set 
inclusion does not change the complexity, while using other preference criteria 
such as minimum cardinality and minimum cardinality with priorities the problems 
are A$-complete. Finally, for minimality wrt set containment with priorities and in 
the general case of an arbitrary (polynomial) ordering of the explanations, the 
problems are complete for the third level of the polynomial hierarchy. 
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This complexity can be reduced of exactly one level if we restrict to theories 2 
composed of Horn clauses. A further reduction is sometimes obtained if we restrict 
to definite Horn clauses. 
Under the Horn clause restriction, Selman and Levesque have proven [1441 that 
a nontrivial explanation can be found in polynomial time. They also prove that 
finding an assumption-based explanation is instead an NP-hard problem, thus 
showing that the restriction to a subset of the literals may affect the complexity of 
inference. A similar phenomenon has been noticed for propositional circumscrip- 
tion with and without varying predicates (see Section 6). Bylander 1211 has focused 
on the more restricted case in which Z is a conjunction of definite clauses, showing 
a polynomial method for finding assumption-based explanations. Another polyno- 
mial subcase has been found by Eshghi [48]. 
As far as Horn clauses are concerned, Selman and Levesque showed that finding 
an explanation, with the additional constraint that it has to contain a predefined 
letter 4, is NP-hard. 
Friedrich, Gottlob, and Nejdl 1531 address problems of skeptical and credulous 
abductive reasoning in definite Horn clauses, proving that deciding whether a letter 
belongs to at least one assumption-based explanation is NP-complete, while the set 
of letters belonging to all the assumption-based explanations can be computed in 
polynomial time. 
The complexity of enumeration problems has also been addressed for abduction. 
The number of explanations can clearly be exponential wrt the size of C, and 
actually Bylander has proven [21] that determining the number of assumption-based 
explanations for definite clauses is complete wrt the class #P (see [74]). A related 
result has been obtained by Friedrich, Gottlob, and Nejdl [53]. 
Logic-based diagnosis has been proposed as a logical reconstruction of de 
Kleer’s assumption-based truth maintenance systems [36]. Among the computa- 
tional tasks that have been addressed in this area there is finding explanations, 
called nogoods, of the atom _L (contradiction). Provan [118, 1191 and Rutenburg 
[133] address the issue of finding the size of a nogood. 
In particular, Rutenburg analyzes several definitions of TM%, considering 
problems like deciding whether there exists a nogood with size less than a 
predefined number k. He shows problems whose complexity ranges from polyno- 
mial to X,,P-complete. These results confirm the intuition that many computational 
tasks of non-monotonic reasoning hide two independent sources of complexity 
whose interaction leads to problems complete for the second level of the polyno- 
mial hierarchy. 
Other forms of abduction have been presented in the literature, but they are 
less related to NMR, and for this reason we will not survey them here. However it 
is worth mentioning the work of Bylander and co-workers [I, 21,221, who take into 
account a very general definition of abduction which subsumes that of [144], 
proving many interesting polynomial as well as NP-hardness results. 
8. POLYNOMIAL REDUCTIONS BETWEEN NMR PROBLEMS 
Most non-monotonic formalisms have been presented and motivated indepen- 
dently. Nevertheless there have been several attempts at relating them and at 
finding suitable translations from one logic into another. The existence of these 
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reductions is not only important for a better semantical understanding of the 
various logics, but it is also useful from the point of view of the complexity analysis. 
We focus on polynomial transformations, but recursive nonpolynomial, transla- 
tions can be used in the same spirit for obtaining new decidability/undecidability 
results. Actually, every polynomial mapping from one formalism into another can 
be used for obtaining new complexity results on both formalisms. We would like to 
illustrate this point by means of a couple of examples, using a well-known 
translation from circumscriptive into default reasoning proposed by Etherington 
[501. 
Let W be a propositional formula on the alphabet L, and (P; 2) a partition of 
L. Let D be the following set of default rules: 
D={( : yJ/~P)lP-} 
and A the default theory (D, W). Etherington [50, Theorem 8.31 shows that 
inference in CZRC(W; P; 2) and A are closely related. Actually, for any formula y 
built with the variables of L, CrRC(W; P; Z) k y if and only if y follows skepti- 
cally from (i.e., in every extension of) A. In the jargon of [150], the default rules of 
D are called prerequisite-free normal unary (PFNU). 
The above result is clearly a translation that can be computed in polynomial 
time and proves that skeptical default reasoning is at least computationally as hard 
as circumscriptive inference, since the latter can be simulated by the former. The 
translation can be used along with a result by Cadoli and Lenzerini [261 for 
obtaining a lower bound on the complexity of skeptical default reasoning for a 
restricted language. In [26] it is shown that when W is 2CNF with no occurrence of 
negative literals and y is a literal, then determining whether CZRC(W; P; 2) k y 
holds is a co-NP-complete problem. Using Etherington’s translation, we have the 
following new complexity result: 
Theorem 1. Let W be a 2CNF formula with no occurrence of negative literals, let D be 
a set of PFNU default rules, and let 1 be any literal. Then determining if 1 is true in 
all the extensions of the default theory ( D, W) is a co-NP-hard problem. 
Theorem 1 can be interestingly compared to a result by Stillman [150, Theorem 
21, stating that if W is a 2CNF formula, D is a set of prerequisite-free normal 
default rules (superset of PFNU), and 1 is a literal, then the problem of determin- 
ing whether 1 is true in at least one extension of (D, W) (credulous inference) can 
be solved in polynomial time. This confirms a previous result by Kautz and Selman, 
discussed in Section 3, which shows that in languages of limited expressiveness 
credulous and skeptical default reasoning may have different complexity. 
We have just seen how a polynomial reduction can be used for obtaining new 
intractability results on the complexity of non-monotonic inference. More formally, 
if we have a polynomial transformation from a decision problem A into a decision 
problem B and we have a lower bound (e.g., co-NP-hardness) on the complexity of 
A, then we can prove the same lower bound for B by means of a many-one 
reduction. 
In fact polynomial transformations can be used for obtaining polynomial results 
as well. For example, the result by Etherington can be read also in the following 
way: If we had a polynomial algorithm for skeptical reasoning with PFNU defaults, 
then we could use that algorithm along with the transformation for performing 
circumscriptive inference in polynomial time. 
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Actually Kautz and Selman [76] show that, if W is a 1CNF formula, D is a set of 
normal unaly default rules (superset of PFNU), and 1 is a literal, then the problem 
of determining whether 1 is true in every extension of (D, W > can be solved in 
polynomial time. Following the previous argument, we have the following result: 
Theorem 2. Let W be a 1CNF formula on the alphabet L, let ( P; Z > be a partition of 
L, and let 1 be any literal. The problem of determining of CIRCCW; P; Z> k 1 is 
polynomial. 
Although Theorem 2 is implied by a result of Cadoli and Lenzerini [26, 
Theorem 71, the above construction gives the flavor of the kind of results that can 
be obtained. 
In [271 Cadoli and Lenzerini show a generalization of the reduction by Ethering- 
ton which allows for fixed predicates. By using this reduction and the complexity 
results surveyed in Sections 3 and 6, they obtain new complexity results both on 
default reasoning and on circumscription. 
The above analysis shows that polynomial translations between formalisms are 
very important tools for designers of algorithms for non-monotonic reasoning. This 
kind of technique has been used for example by Gottlob [64] for proving a lower 
bound for credulous reasoning in the non-monotonic modal logic N defined by 
Marek and Truszczynski [95]. Gottlob used the polynomial embedding (defined by 
Marek and Truszczynski) of default logic into the logic N along with the fact that 
credulous default reasoning is Z$-hard, for proving that credulous reasoning in N 
is Zj’-hard as well. 
In the rest of this section we survey some of the polynomial reductions between 
non-monotonic reasoning problems that have been proposed in the literature. It is 
worth noticing that those reductions have been studied with the primary goal of 
comparing semantics and expressiveness and were not intended for complexity 
analysis. In particular, transformations are usually required to fulfill some abstract 
criteria. Modularity, defined by Imielinski [72] in the context of translations from 
default logic into circumscription, is one of these criteria. Loosely speaking, a 
translation is modular if the introduction of new facts does not require recomputa- 
tion of the whole translation from the beginning. 
Grosof [691, Imielinski [72], and Etherington [50, 511 addressed the issue of 
translating default theories into circumscriptive ones. Transformation for some 
restricted classes of default theories, such as propositional seminormal defaults 
without prerequisites, are shown. 
Several authors have shown the relations within autoepistemic and default logic. 
In particular, Konolige [791 has shown a translation from default logic into strongly 
grounded autoepistemic logic, while Marek and Truszczynski [95] have shown an 
embedding of default logic in the non-monotonic logic N. In a recent paper [65], 
Gottlob has shown a nonmodular embedding of default logic into standard au- 
toepistemic logic, also proving that no modular translation is possible. All the 
above translations are defined for the whole class of propositional default theories. 
If we restrict our attention to prerequisite-free default theories, then there is a very 
simple and modular translation which maps single defaults into single modal 
formulae. This transformation is shown by Gottlob [65] but it is already implicit in 
the work of Lin and Shoham [87]. We notice that several results surveyed in 
Section 3 are valid for prerequisite-free default theories. 
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It is proven by Gelfond and Lifschitz [57] that whenever a program has a single 
stable model, then the corresponding set of autoepistemic premises has a single 
stable expansion and the two coincide in the nonmodal part. As a consequence, all 
the reasoning tasks for the class of autoepistemic theories which are translations of 
stratified logic programs can be decided in polynomial time. Other reductions from 
logic programs to default and autoepistemic logic have been shown by Marek and 
TruszczyUi [94]. 
Cadoli, Eiter, and Gottlob [25] showed a polynomial transformation of any 
inference problem relative to a circumscription with varying predicates into an- 
other inference relative to a circumscription with no varying predicates. Previous 
attempts at eliminating the varying predicates (see Yuan and Wang 11571) caused 
exponential growth of the underlying formula. The method in [251 can be used 
together with another method defined by de Kleer and Konolige [37] for eliminat- 




formula, for example, a Horn formula may be changed into a 
In this paper we have surveyed complexity results for many non-monotonic 
formalisms. In particular, we have focused on those which are more directly related 
to the field of logic programming. We have seen that all forms of non-monotonicity 
add a new source of complexity to reasoning. In particular, NMR is strictly harder 
than classical reasoning for first-order languages and it is harder in the proposi- 
tional case unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at a sufficiently low level. 
Due to the lack of space we have not been able to report on complexity results 
for other areas of NMR, such as belief revision, non-monotonic inheritance 
networks, and the axiomatic approaches to NMR. Nevertheless, we want to give 
some pointers to the complexity results presented in the literature. 
In the area of belief revision and update, important results can be found in the 
works by Eiter and Gottlob [45, 431, Nebel [105, 1061, and Grahne and Mendelzon 
WI. 
The complexity of reasoning in nonmontonic inheritance networks has been 
analyzed by Horty, Thomason, and Touretzky 1711, Selman and Levesque [143l, 
Geffner and Vet-ma [55], Cadoli et al. [28], and Stein [1491. 
Lehmann and Magidor [83] give some results on the computational complexity 
of various axiomatic systems for non-monotonic reasoning. 
In all the works we have surveyed, tractability is obtained through restricting the 
expressive power of the language. A rather different approach is based on the use 
of procedures for approximated inference. Some results on the use of approximated 
inference in NMR can be found in the work by Cadoli and Schaerf [291 and 
Etherington and Crawford [52]. 
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